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Abstract 
The 1995 local-level government reforms undertaken in Papua New Guinea (PNG) were largely in 
response to increasing concern that the public service was failing in its responsibility towards the 
people.  As a result, the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial and Local Governments (OLPLLG) was 
established.  The prime purpose of this was to address this issue through deeper engagement of the 
lower levels of government, particularly local-level governments (LLGs). Almost two decades on, 
poor socio-economic conditions and deterioration in infrastructure/services suggest that the proposed 
change has not materialised.  The purpose of this paper is to address the question of whether the 
lower tiers of government are capable of implementing the development plans under the reforms.  The 
paper finds that the 1995 reforms have made LLGs dependent upon their Joint District Planning and 
Budget Priorities Committee (JDP & BPC) and their district administration, which have become the 
main impediment to local government effectiveness.  This in turn has greatly hindered LLG capacity 
and has reinforced unequal relations, rather than assisting service delivery in PNG.  There is 
therefore a need to make LLGs more effective players.  
Key words: local-level government, development planning, Joint District Planning and Budget 
Priorities Committee, district administration  
Introduction 
States all over the world have attempted to usher in socio-economic change via planned efforts, which 
are basically organised attempts to identify the most effective strategies to achieve targeted goals 
(Turner and Hulme 1997: 134).  This activity implies the creation and formulation of policies to 
achieve effective development outcomes for citizens.  These efforts have come to be known as 
development strategies/plans. Plans however are mere words on paper.  Effective implementation to 
achieve the desired results requires reliable implementing agencies.  In most cases, it is the state's 
public service/bureaucracy which is designated as implementing agent. The effectiveness of this 
agent’s work will determine the final output of the plan.    
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Papua New Guinea (PNG) as a nation has established a variety of development plans since 
independence. The current socio-economic indicators however reveal very poor performance.  For 
instance, it has been indicated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) that PNG shows 
very little progress in achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 
(UNDP 2011: 6).  Furthermore the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has found that social indicators 
in PNG are far below those of similar income-per-capita countries (ADB 2010: 5).  Access to vital 
services such as health, education and transport infrastructure has deteriorated quite rapidly in recent 
years (Cammack 2008: 6).  Indeed, in 2009 participants at a conference in Sydney on the theme 
‘tackling extreme poverty’ noted that conditions had in recent years seen a drastic decline in PNG 
(Hayward-Jones and Copus-Campbell 2009: 1).  This is all taking place at a period when the country 
is experiencing a resource boom.  The state however, has failed to effectively translate these gains 
into sound development outcomes (AUSAID 2008: 23).  The inability to effectively implement 
development agendas has had a disproportionate impact in rural areas of PNG (UNESCO 2007: 9).  
This negative consequence is grave, as 85% of the country's population live in rural areas.  
It is against this backdrop that this paper raises the following question: How effective is the state in 
implementing national development strategy and plans at the LLG level?  Indications of decline in 
rural service delivery, deteriorating infrastructure and low income earning opportunities call into 
question whether LLGs are effective implementers.  This article therefore focuses on the LLG arena.  
This paper is drawn from the author’s PhD research looking into the reasons for the failure of LLG 
decentralisation to achieve effective rural development outcomes in PNG. In the process, the 
problems behind the establishment and implementation of development plans were identified. The 
research was undertaken in Dreikikir, East Sepik Province. Dreikikir LLG was selected as the study 
site as it was one of the most remote, rural and underdeveloped areas in the country. It thus provided a 
good test of whether development plans were being developed and implemented effectively in rural 
areas. It is hoped that the study of Dreikikir will offer insight into the plight of many rural districts in 
PNG.  
The study used two main sources: primary interviews and secondary information (namely published 
literature). Interviews were conducted with seven district officials in Ambunti-Dreikikier District 
Administration and ten ward members. All interviews were carried out on a one-to-one basis at 
various locations in Ambunti-Dreikikir District and Dreikikir LLG area, between September 2012 and 
October 2013. The seven Ambunti-Dreikikir District officials interviewed were selected according to 
the different administrative functions they performed in the district and LLG. The wards from which 
they were selected were chosen based on two primary factors: distance from the local government 
outpost and population size. Thus Ward 7 had only 300 citizens whilst Ward 1 had 1,200 citizens. 
Ward 7 also was located over three hours (by foot) from the government outpost of Dreikikir, whilst 
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Ward 2 was only 30 minutes.  However, the distance to access main services such as roads, health 
centres and services provided by the local government station of Dreikikir were the main factors in 
selecting the wards.  Among its questions, interviews with ward members looked at whether the wards 
in Dreikikir LLG had local development plans targeting these access issues. 
Secondary sources such as published literature were primarily used to complement the findings of the 
interviews. This included the Ambunti-Dreikikir District Plan, which offered vital information about 
the district. Other works were used to relate this experience to other areas of the country. The findings 
were then analysed and are presented in this paper. 
Importance of local-level governments 
The role of local-level governments as a public service delivery mechanism and agent of state 
functions is of critical important within a decentralised state.  The theory is  that through devolution1 
of powers, functions and responsibilities, lower levels of government will become more efficient and 
responsive to local needs (Arun and Ribot 2002; Omar, Kähkönen and Meagher 2001).  This 
approach is seen as strengthening accountability and increasing participation of local citizens in the 
decision-making process, as well as resulting in implementation of strategies best suited for their 
localities (Scott 2009; Ahmad et al 2005; Brenton 1999; Smoke 2003).  The aspiration is that local-
level governments will deliver more effectively in areas where the national government may lack 
insight, and that they will become an essential mechanism for the roll-out of state services and 
programmes.  
According to Kimura (2011: 19-20), five features determine the effectiveness of a local government. 
These are: 
a) the relation between central government and local governments 
b) the relationships between the various levels of government 
c) the capacity development of local governments  
d) local systems for building local economic development 
e) participation mechanisms for citizens 
 
Kimura's features will be used in this paper’s analysis; the capacity development of local 
governments, local systems for building local economic development, and the relationships between 
central governments and local governments.  A proper understanding of how local governments 
function in relation to these features is essential to appreciate the constraints they experience.  
However, Kimura (2011: 17) notes two further problematic issues affecting efforts to decentralise to 
lower tiers of government.  These are reluctance by central governments to delegate powers to lower 
levels, and the capture of benefits by local elites when power is shared.  In the PNG context these are 
 
1
 Decentralisation may be in the form of either devolution or deconcentration.  
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very evident.  As this paper will show, the 1995 reforms have reinforced the role of national 
politicians and ultimately have led to heavy politicisation in the districts. 
PNG’s 1995 reforms were a response to general frustration at the state's inability to deliver much- 
needed services to the people (Kalinoe 2009: 2).  The reforms therefore aimed to deliver services 
effectively to the rural population, increase citizen participation and devolve more functions and 
responsibilities, together with more funding, to lower levels of government (Kalinoe 2009: 4). 
Development planning in Papua New Guinea 
As at the date of this paper, PNG has undertaken ten different development plans.  The first from the 
Australian colonial administration in 1963 (Yala and Sanida 2010: 45).  Since then there have been 
nine others, including the current one launched in 2011. 
For the co-ordination of various development plans, the Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring (DNPM) was established in 1992 (Dobie and Nirody 1996: 2). The DNPM has since 
assumed responsibility for overall strategy and guidance on all development initiatives.  Political links 
to the plans however remain weak, because political parties do not create plans to be implemented.  
Unlike other countries, where party policies and platforms influence the direction of planning, PNG 
lacks this political party linkage.  Although there are political parties, all signs of ideology are absent 
from them.  They operate on fluid ideologies and policies and realign whenever the situation requires.  
As a result, the planning process in PNG is largely co-ordinated by technocrats with no particular 
affiliation to any political party (Yala and Sanida 2010: 45). 
Preparation of plans 
Provincial governments, districts (electorates), LLGs, and wards are mandated by law to produce 
development plans based on national priorities and targets customised to their localities (Kalinoe 
2009: 31).  Hence provincial plans are created by the provincial planning office, to establish the 
province's goals in line with the national development plan targets and priority areas for the province.  
Meanwhile each LLG is required to use all their wards’ plans to create their LLG plan.  The district 
then incorporates all its LLG plans into the district plan.  The district’s key role is to integrate the 
‘top-down’ planning of the province and nation with the ‘bottom-up’ planning of the LLGs (Barcham 
2009: 15).  The aim is to merge bottom-up planning with a top-down strategy approach, thus creating 
a realistic plan which addresses development challenges effectively at each level.  It is the 
responsibility of the district administrator to ensure that the planning capacity of LLGs and wards in 
their district is adequate to discharge their mandated responsibilities from plan design to eventual 
implementation. The provincial hierarchy has ultimate responsibility for overseeing all the districts 
within its jurisdiction, which includes LLGs and wards.   
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Political and administrative background in the provinces 
Under the 1995 reforms the previous provincial government system was abolished with the 
introduction of the OLPLLG.  This system, trialled between 1995-1997, entailed profound changes in 
provincial government systems, operation and structure (Kalinoe 2009: 3).   
           Figure 1: Provincial Political and Administrative Outline 
 Source: modified by author from Edmiston 2002: 5)  
 
Political structure Administrative structure 
a) Provincial executive council a) Provincial administration 
b) Provincial assembly  b) District administration 
c) Local-level governments   
d) Wards  
 
A notable feature of the 1995 reforms was the establishment of a Joint Provincial Planning and 
Budget Priorities Committee (JPP & BPC) and a Joint District Planning and Budget Priorities 
Committee (JDP & BPC) at the provincial and district levels respectively.  The purpose of these two 
committees is to co-ordinate all planning and assess/approve funding priorities for development 
projects.  The committees were intended to be forums for the political and administrative sectors to 
meet at their relevant levels. 
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Each provincial executive council is responsible for setting up a JPP & BPC.  By contrast, however, 
the JDP & BPC is established by the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level Governments 
and hence requires no establishment by any committee.  It comprises the local MP (who is the 
chairperson), the presidents/mayors2 of LLGs in the electoral area, representatives for women, 
business and religious sectors, and the district administrator.  
The administrative head of the province is the provincial administrator,3 who is also the chief 
executive officer of the provincial government, with district administrators under him.  The provincial 
administrator’s role is to supervise all public service functions and administrative services within the 
province.  At the district level, the district administrator performs this role in co-ordination with their 
district administration. Their main duties involve discharging their public service functions and 
implementing plans and policies established by the provincial and district administrations. 
Within each province there are smaller electorates.  Each electorate has an administrative centre, often 
referred to as the district, and within the district there are between four to six LLGs.  The LLGs in 
turn are made up of wards – 30-40 wards per LLG. Wards are usually a grouping of one or more 
villages, depending upon population.  Wards elect a ward member to their local LLG every five years.  
The LLG president/mayor however is directly elected by all citizens in the LLG.   
District administration structure 
District administrations are not politically 
elected bodies; rather they are 
administrative units made up of local 
public service sectoral heads and other 
officials.  The main function of these 
officials is to co-ordinate and ensures the 
delivery of public services to their 
designated local areas.  However, all 
public service officials are paid by the 
national government, not the provincial, 
district or local-level government.  Nor do 
sectoral heads participate in the JDP & 
BPC.                     Figure 2: District Structure (Source: Author) 
 
 

The title of president is given to heads of rural LLGs, whilst heads of urban LLGs are known as mayors.

The provincial administrator is the highest ranking public official in a province.
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Under the structure introduced in 1995, greater responsibility over health, education, agriculture, 
upkeep of infrastructure and local programmes was transferred to district level. The provincial 
administrations’ role was reduced to mainly technical advice and support.  However, each department 
within the districts still receives departmental funds, depending on the departmental programmes 
undertaken.  All matters in relation to the district also still go through the district management team 
meeting – which brings together all district divisional heads and the district administrator – and which 
later conveys its issues/concerns to the JDP & BPC.  As a result the JDP & BPC has become the main 
co-ordinating centre from which the district organises public service delivery in its area (including 
LLGs and wards).  
Under the 1995 structure, LLGs came to find themselves with greater responsibility in a number of 
areas: health (rural health centres); education (elementary and primary schools4); local economic 
development (in co-operation with the district administration); the maintenance of feeder roads; and 
other issues affecting local people.  The reforms envisaged that the LLGs would be an essential 
mechanism for delivering the anticipated improved outcomes.  
Development planning, implementation and monitoring at the district level 
The JDP & BPC, in partnership with the district administration, is responsible for overall co-
ordination of planning, implementation and monitoring, as well as allocation of funding for priority 
areas within the district.  It is responsible for the district’s five-year development plans, complete with 
financial estimates; and for the review of ongoing plans (Cammack 2008: 16; Axline 2008: 19).  In 
theory implementation now occurs according to resolutions passed at JDP & BPC meetings, and it is 
now the responsibility of the district administrator to implement those resolutions.  This involves, for 
example, processing cheques through the district/provincial treasury and supervising planned projects.  
Revenue sources and funding for provincial and local-level governments 
Under the 1995 reforms, the OLPLLG identifies various funding streams to be made available to each 
level of government to implement initiatives (Independent State of Papua New Guinea 1998).  The 
following are the types of funding available by law to both provincial and local-level governments 
(wards are included within LLGs): 
a) Provincial/district Service Improvement Programme grants  
b) Provincial/district support grants   
c) Administrative support grants (province and LLG) 
d) Development grants (province, LLG and ward) 
e) Taxable revenue where applicable (province and LLG) 
f) LLG Service Improvement Program (LLGSIP)5.  
 
4
 PNG Education System: Elementary Schools comprise of Elementary Prep, Elementary One and Elementary Two. Primary 
School consists of grades 3 - 8. 
5
 The LLGSIP is a recent addition to the list of funds and is specifically designated for LLGs. 
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It has now been over 15 years since the implementation of the 1995 reforms.  However the anticipated 
outcomes have not eventuated.  Instead, conditions are actually deteriorating.  This suggests that the 
development plans are not being implemented effectively.   
The remainder of this paper looks at the challenges local-level governments face in implementing 
development plans, using Dreikikir LLG as a case study.  The study was based on interviews 
conducted with ten ward members (known as ward councillors) in Drekikier LLG – one each from 
Wards 1 to 10 – together with seven officials from the Dreikikir district administration.  It is 
acknowledged that a case study cannot be taken as representative of all areas in PNG; but findings 
from available literature, which have been used to complement the present research, indicate that 
many of the issues faced by Dreikikir are common to other LLGs.  
The case of Dreikikir local-level government  
Dreikikir LLG is one of the four LLGs located in the Ambunti-Drekikier Open Electorate (ie 
‘constituency’) in PNG’s East Sepik Province (National Research Institute) 2010: 114). 
Administratively, the electorate has two district centres: Ambunti, where certain offices such as the 
district treasury are located; and Dreikikir, where other offices such as the Department of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Wildlife (DALW) are located. This anomaly is a consequence of the realignment of 
boundaries associated with the 1995 reforms (Kalinoe 2009). Under the 1995 reforms the JDP & BPC 
for Ambunti-Dreikikir District is the main co-ordinating body, under which are the Ambunti-Dreikikir 
district administration, followed by the four LLGs – of which Drekikier LLG is one – and finally, at 
the most local level, the wards.  
Geographically, Dreikikir LLG is located in the foothills of the Torricelli mountain range and benefits 
from fertile agricultural land.  It covers an area of 1,200km2 and has a population of 19,000 spread 
over 33 wards.  Its population density is 3.6/km2 (Ambunti-Dreikikir District Office 2008: 17).  The 
population of the wards studied ranged from 300 (Ward 7) to 1,200 (Ward 1).  The majority of the 
population own land via customary land tenure and are subsistence farmers who produce staple food 
crops of taro, banana and yams, mainly for their own consumption.  Their main source of income is 
the production of cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, vanilla and betel nut (Hanson et al 2001: 213).  
Earnings, however, are very low and heavily dependent on international commodity prices.  As a 
result the average income in the area is about 41-100 kina (US$15.1-US$36.8) a year per person 
(Hanson et al 2001: 209).  There are also a few successful business people who operate small trading 
stores offering basic goods such as rice, tinned fish, salt, sugar etc. However, most local enterprises in 
the wards, such as cocoa bean drying facilities and transport services, are primarily clan-based 
projects, utilising family ties to raise any funds needed as well as provide physical manpower when 
required.   
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There is, however, a lack of credit facilities, co-operative structures and proper markets for local food 
crops.  Extension activities and advice are unreliable and are not provided by DAWL officers. A good 
example is the problem of cocoa pod borer moth, which is currently ravaging the area. Most citizens 
have received no assistance from the officials tasked to help them address such difficulties.  As a 
result, people do their best within their capacities. 
Deficits in basic services  
Drekikier LLG has a total of 30 educational facilities: 11 lower primary schools, 13 upper primary 
schools, four elementary schools (elementary preparatory to elementary 2), one high school, and one 
technical vocational centre (Ambunti-Dreikikir District Office 2008: 24).  The responsibility for the 
upkeep and maintenance of elementary schools and lower primary schools falls to Dreikikir LLG.  
However, most of these schools operate in facilities made from bush materials; very few have a 
classroom or staff house made from durable materials.  There is high student retention problem in the 
schools in the area (Ambunti-Dreikikir District Office 2008: 39).  Staff shortages are also a problem, 
as teachers often do not want to take up posts in such a remote area.  However, the main problem has 
been to effectively maintain the quality of education.  Currently, the majority of students do not 
progress to upper secondary.   
There is no access to electricity in the LLG and wards, apart from via portable generators.  The 
district administration in Dreikikir does have a large generator, but it only provides a reliable service 
when funds are made available by the provincial administration for the purchase of fuel.  Even then it 
only runs for 5-6 hours a day, at night-time.6  Although the generator may be adequate to deliver  rural 
electrification to nearby wards, this has yet to happen. 
Piped water is non-existent within the LLG.  Wards in the area rely on water catchment tanks and 
traditional water wells. AUSAID (the Australian Agency for International Development) has recently 
initiated a water catchment project in certain wards to address supply problems but this project is 
reliant upon rainfall.  
Dreikikir LLG has a total of 15 health facilities: one main health centre and 14 rural health centres 
(Ambunti-Dreikikir District Office 2008: 25).  Responsibility for the 14 rural health centres/aid posts 
lies with the LLG.  However, of these 14 centres nine have shut down – principally due to poor 
physical condition and the remaining health facilities are also run down. On the whole the Dreikikir 
LLG health sector suffers from: a lack of proper infrastructure or equipment; a lack of capacity to 
undertake rural extension work or maintain current facilities; and an absence of control strategies to 
 

Information supplied by Dreikikir District Administration finance and administration officer, October 2013, 
Dreikikir.
Barcson               Development planning for local-level governments: Papua New Guinea 

CJLG June 2015 

159
address malaria and other infectious diseases.7  The average life expectancy in the area is 54, with an 
infant mortality rate of 84 per 1,000.  Leading causes of death have been pneumonia (8 per 1,000), 
prenatal conditions (8 per 1,000), tuberculosis (5 per 1,000) and malaria (Ambunti-Dreikikir District 
Office 2008: 5).  Most of these deaths take place in the wards, where the rural health centres are 
supposed to assist but are either unable do so or not operational.   
Roads are also problematic. Like most LLGs in PNG, Dreikikir is a rural LLG.  Access to the nearby 
township of Maprik and the provincial capital of Wewak is by road.  The main mode of transport is by 
public motor vehicles operated by individuals in the area.  The LLG is responsible for three main 
feeder roads with a total length of 49.5km.  The current state of these feeder roads is that they have 
deteriorated into bush tracks.  This makes it hard for wards both to transport cash crops and to bring in 
goods for small store owners.  Some 45% of wards in the LLG are located near the roads, but the 
remaining 55% are less fortunate and are even more cut off  (Ambunti-Dreikikir District Office 2008: 
27).  Accessibility to reliable health services and good schools is also affected by the road network, as 
most functioning health centres and schools are located along the main Sepik Highway.  The further 
from the highway residents are, the more unreliable the services they receive (Hanson et al 2001: 
211).  This study noted, however, that many public service officials in remote areas of the LLG do 
their best to try to deliver despite these difficulties.   
Dreikikir LLG's problems can therefore be grouped into five areas.  Firstly, it has a problem 
addressing rural healthcare effectively.  Secondly, it faces the challenge of how to develop the local 
economy.  Thirdly, it needs to improve the quality of education, as well as the services provided in its 
elementary schools and lower primary schools.  Fourthly, it needs to improve rural electrification and 
water supply. And finally, the LLG has failed to maintain its feeder roads.   
These wide-ranging problems call into question the ability of Dreikikir LLG to meet its targets.  This 
paper will now consider the factors hindering effective implementation of development plans in 
Dreikikir LLG. 
As identified above, Kimura (2011) notes five features essential to determining the capacity of local 
governments.  The following three will be used to analyse Drekikier LLG's challenges:  
a) the capacity development of local governments) 
b) systems for building local economic development 
c) the relationships between the various levels of government. 
In Dreikikir LLG’s case, the specific challenges encountered can be described as:  
a) the capacity of Dreikikir LLG to address its mandated functions 
b) the ability of Dreikikir LLG to develop a system for local economic development 
c) the nature of power relations between Dreikikir LLG, its local district administration and local JDP & 
BPC. 
 

Health extension officer, October 2013, Dreikikier Sub Health Center, East Sepik Province, Papua New 
Guinea.
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Capacity of Dreikikir LLG to address its mandated functions 
Dreikikir LLG is mandated to deliver district-level services which include health (rural centres), 
education (elementary schools/lower primary schools), infrastructure development/feeder road 
maintenance, and agriculture extension activities. Its capacity to deliver these depends upon three 
main elements: funding, human resources and the ability to make independent administrative 
decisions.  If these three attributes are lacking or inadequate, capacity to deliver the required services 
will be severely impaired.  
However, all these elements seem to be in deficit within Dreikikir LLG.  Firstly, most essential 
funding is not directly delivered to Dreikikir LLG.  Under the OLPLLG, Ambunti-Dreikikir JDP & 
BPC is responsible for determining the budget breakdown of Dreikikir LLG.  Dreikikir LLG is 
required to submit funding proposals to the JDP & BPC and to district officials for its planned targets.  
However, as noted by the Dreikikir District finance administration officer8 funds can only be allocated 
to an LLG if they are requested following a resolution at an LLG meeting and submitted to his office 
for processing.  Failure to do this will mean non-payment of funds.  This puts Dreikikir LLG in a very 
difficult position, as the JDP & BPC is often manipulated by the local MP (see section ‘Politics and 
manipulation’ below). Furthermore, LLG funding from the provincial administration is unreliable.  
The acting LLG manager9 noted that often such funding arrives late, and is diverted or reduced by the 
district administration and JDP & BPC before reaching the LLG.  Finally, the local revenue base10 for 
Dreikikir LLG from taxes, the LLGSIP and licences is not sufficient to undertake large projects.  
Examples of these difficulties can be seen in several sectors in Dreikikir LLG.  For instance, the 
maintenance and upkeep of rural health centres is the responsibility of Dreikikir LLG.  However, the 
present study’s interview with the district health extension officer11 (HEO) revealed that the district 
had had to take over the health centres as the LLG was unable to maintain them adequately leading to 
deterioration of the infrastructure and closure of several centres.  The HEO also noted that the LLG 
realised what was happening, but was handicapped by the administration and the JDP & BPC due to 
organisational issues.  The education sector of Dreikikir LLG provides another example.  Most major 
funding for schools is controlled by the district education advisor (DEA) and requires verification by 
him/her before disbursement to school accounts.  This leaves room for manipulation of funds by the 
DEA.  At Arkwemb Lower Primary School in Ward 7 (Misim Village), for instance, the local ward 
member12 attempted on numerous occasions to secure necessary funds for this school, located in his 
 
8
 Dreikikir District Administration finance and administration officer, October 2013, Dreikikir District Office, East Sepik 
Province, Papua New Guinea. 
9
 Acting LLG manager, Dreikikir LLG, October, 2013, Drekikier LLG Chambers, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
(LLG managers generally perform the function of administrative officer for an LLG.) 
10
 Interviewee confidential, October 2013, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
11
 Health extension officer, Drekikier Sub Health Center, October 2013, Drekikier Sub Health Center, East Sepik Province, 
Papua New Guinea. 
12
 Interviewee confidential, October 2013, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
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ward.  The provincial education office referred him to his DEA, but despite prolonged discussion with 
the DEA the money was never received.  A former DEA interviewed13 also noted that LLG funds for 
education matters were often diverted from the LLG by the district administration and the JDP & 
BPC.  LLG feeder roads, electricity supply and water supply systems offer yet more examples of the 
fiscal deficiency of Dreikikir LLG.   
A former president14 of the LLG stressed in interview that he had intended to address these issues, but 
was handicapped as he had no control over the funds.  It seems clear that Dreikikir LLG's financial 
capacity is weak, unreliable and controlled by district administration officials and the JDP & BPC.   
The second aspect of Dreikikir LLG’s lack of capacity relates to human and technical resources. 
According to the structure outlined above, Dreikikir LLG must produce a development plan 
incorporating all the individual plans of its wards and aligning them with provincial and national 
priorities, but customised to meet the needs and priorities of the locality.  However, Dreikikir LLG 
does not have an LLG development plan,15 nor do its wards have ward development plans. All ten of 
the ward members16 interviewed stated that they had no ward plans, ward books or ward development 
committees in place.  They were aware that the district had a development plan, but they had not seen 
it or understood its main goals and targets, nor how it would be applicable to them.  When asked if 
ward members and the general public were consulted during the planning process, the district finance 
administration officer17 claimed that wide consultation was undertaken.  However, a common 
sentiment expressed by ward members was that the district administration never engaged them in 
consultation.  Furthermore, they noted that district officials never offered any skills training to educate 
them in the process of plan formulation, data collection or goal identification. The acting LLG 
manager18 for Dreikikir LLG commented that, due to incompetent officers being hired as a result of 
cronyism, the relevant district officer could not effectively assist the LLG or ward members in such 
matters as he was not qualified for the job.  Simultaneously, a former LLG president19 noted that the 
LLG had no development plan in place, nor had it undertaken extensive data collection exercises, or 
kept effective records.  A former LLG manager20 commented that when he had worked for Dreikikir 
LLG, in 2009, most administrative activities were based on guesswork rather than data, as there was 
no proper data collection system or qualified personnel to collect the data.  This author would argue 
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 Former district education advisor for Ambunti-Drekikier, October 2013, Dreikikir District Office, East Sepik Province, 
Papua New Guinea 

 Former district education advisor for Ambunti-Dreikier, October 2013,East Spipik Province, Papua New Guinea 
15
 Interviewees confidential, September 2012, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
16
 Interviewees confidential, September 2012, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
17
 Interviewee confidential, October 2013, Dreikikir, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
18
 Interviewee confidential, October 2013, Dreikikir Council Chambers, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
19
 Former LLG president, Dreikikir LLG, Dreikikir Station, October 2013, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New 
Guinea. 
20
 Former LLG manager, Dreikikir LLG, Drekikier Council Chambers, October 2013, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua 
New Guinea. 
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however that blame does not lie only with the LLG, as the JDP & BPC and district administration 
officials have failed to develop LLG capacity.  
A final consideration is the capacity of Dreikikir LLG for independent decision-making.  As 
illustrated above, fiscal decisions are largely in the hands of the district administration and the JDP & 
BPC, leaving little scope for the LLG to influence the process.  As far as administrative decisions are 
concerned there seems to be very little clarity about what the functions and responsibilities of LLGs 
are for instance, two or more wards may share a common facility, such as a rural health centre or 
elementary school.  However, it is not clear from the OLPLLG how exactly they should work together 
to maintain the quality of these joint facilities.  Five21 ward members, whose wards shared a rural 
health centre, also noted that the managers of the facility had no accountability towards them as local 
leaders – but only towards their departmental and district administration superiors.  The health 
extension officer interviewed22 confirmed this: namely that accountability was mostly on 
departmental and district administration lines, leaving the local leaders on the sidelines.  A similar 
situation prevails in the case of elementary schools in the area. 
It therefore appears that the decision-making capacity of Dreikikir LLG over both financial and 
administrative issues in sectors such as health and education is weak.  Once again power is 
concentrated in the hands of district administration officials, leaving little room for the LLG to take 
effective decisions on essential issues such as non-performing teachers/health workers, or funding 
matters. 
Ability of the LLG to develop a system for local economic development 
As Dreikikir is a rural area, the most viable form of local economic development is endogenous 
development – ie utilising local resources.  The main local resources in Dreikikir LLG are cash crops 
and food produce. Labour, capital and land also need to be available, supported by good infrastructure 
(facilities and roads), support organisations (eg co-operatives) and access to good markets.  However, 
while land and labour are abundant, there is a big problem in delivering infrastructure such as roads, 
which is difficult to remedy given the fiscal capacity of the LLG.  Secondly, decision-making over 
agricultural issues is largely in the hands of district officials with little involvement of LLG officials.  
For instance, the ward members interviewed23 claimed it was difficult to gain access to staff at the 
district office.  As a result, they were not aware of any specific projects that would involve them or 
how they could incorporate the DALW's activities into their own plans.  They also commented the 
staff was not in their offices most of the time, and there was little the LLG could do to address this 
problem.  
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 Interviewees confidential, September 2012, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
22
 Health extension officer, Drekikier Sub Health Center, October 2013, Drekikier Sub Health Center, East Sepik Province, 
Papua New Guinea.
23
 Interviewees confidential, September 2012, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
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Developing a successful local economy would require Dreikikir LLG to have effective agricultural 
outreach programmes, good co-operative agencies, good feeder roads and micro-credit facilities 
within its jurisdiction.  However the LLG lacks both the fiscal capacity to develop these essential 
components and the decision-making capacity to develop suitable plans on its own.  
Power relations between Dreikikir LLG, the district administration and the JDP & BPC 
Dreikikir LLG and its ward members exemplify a situation in which the LLG is largely prevented 
from effectively carrying out its duties, and is highly dependent on the district administration and the 
JDP & BPC.  In turn, the district administration and the JDP & BPC are heavily manipulated by the 
local MP, with JDP & BPC members and the general public unable to exert much influence.  Under 
the OLPLLG, the local MP automatically chairs the JDP & BPC, and there should be effective co-
ordination and guidance from the JDP & BPC to all levels under it.  This has not happened. Instead, 
there has been an abuse of power by the MP.  Six24 of the seven district officials interviewed said that 
the JDP & BPC was much politicised and was not effectively discharging its responsibilities.  A 
former president of Dreikikir LLG, Mr Manarip, noted that the JDP & BPC was only good at making 
resolutions, not implementing them.  According to Mr Manarip, there was no good management or 
effective direction from the JDP & BPC.  This affected the district administration and created large 
gaps between the MP, the JDP & BPC, the district administration and the LLG over funding and 
implementation priorities.  The district finance and administration officer noted that projects were 
never discussed, but rather were controlled and allocated along cronyism lines, often highly 
influenced by politics.  Three25 of the officers interviewed strongly hinted that such politicisation had 
rendered the district administration largely ineffective and weak, and staff was simply puppets of the 
MP.  As a result, working relations between these levels were not good. 
Capacity constraints of LLGs 
As seen above, Dreikikir LLG’s capacity as a local partner institution has been severely hindered by 
the district administration and the JDP & BPC.  Reviewing these challenges, four main impediments 
to the LLG's effectiveness can be identified: lack of planning, inequality of funding arrangements, 
politics and manipulation, and marginalisation.  
Lack of planning 
In order for outcomes to be achieved, effective planning practices are required.  These however do not 
exist in Dreikikir LLG and its wards, largely due to a failure by the district administration and the JDP 
& BPC to develop local planning capacity.  This problem is replicated throughout the country.  A 
study undertaken by Zahid, Keefer and Menzies (2011: 4) indicated that 50% of LLG wards had no 
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 Health extension officer Drekikier Sub Health Centre, former district education advisor for Ambunti-Drekikier, Dreikikir 
District Administration finance and administrative officer, acting LLG manager for Dreikikir LLG, former KKG president 
Drekikier LLG, Dreikikir agriculture extension officer, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
25
 Health extension officer Drekikier Sub Health Centre, former district education advisor for Ambunti-Drekikier, acting 
LLG manager for Dreikikir LLG, Drekikier, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea. 
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plan of any type.  Another study, conducted by the Constitutional Law Reform Commission and 
covering six provinces, also found this to be a recurring issue (Kalinoe 2009: 13).  Allen and Hasnin 
(2010: 14) further note that LLGs’ roles in PNG have largely been stifled due to ineffective planning, 
while Barter26 (2004) points out that state has failed at the lower levels of government to put in place 
effective planning components, such as staffing and essential funding, which would enable capacity to 
be developed.  The main constraint in this area is a lack of human resources and proper co-ordination 
by those responsible for developing the required skills within LLGs and wards.  As a result, planning 
processes are non-existent in the majority of LLGs and wards in PNG. 
Inequality of funding arrangements 
Drekikier LLG is financially reliant upon its district administration, its JDP & BPC and its provincial 
administration.  Its revenue-raising capacity is limited to certain taxes, which are insufficient to fund, 
undertake and sustain large-scale projects.  Also, as a result of inequitable fiscal regulations, Drekikier 
LLG has suffered diversion of funds and manipulation by those officers who do have fiscal control.  
This finding is replicated in most LLGs across the country.  For instance, Allen and Hasnain (2010: 
14) comment that provincial governments have been seen to starve most LLGs in the country of 
funds, rather than effectively assist them.  There is also no proper funding structure to support 
facilities which are shared between wards; or, according to Ketan (2007), to allocate funds between 
districts and LLGs.  LLG funding arrangements are thus profoundly problematic, and LLGs are 
dependent rather than self-reliant.  As a result most LLGs become victims, as funding processes are 
hijacked by leading local officials (Hegarty 2009).   
Politics and manipulation 
The case study of Dreikikir LLG reveals significant politicisation and manipulation within essential 
structures such as the JDP & BPC and the district administration.  These problems have led to a 
decline in the productivity of Dreikikir LLG, because when a JDP & BPC becomes dysfunctional it 
renders LLGs dysfunctional also. This has happened quite frequently in PNG.  For instance, Allen and 
Hasnain (2010: 22) note the case of Southern Highlands, Mendi and Koroba Lake Kopiago, where the 
JDP & BPC never even met, but instead the MPs appropriated local funds for ‘pork barrel’ politics.  
In another example, a New Ireland provincial governor used political cronyism to bypass district and 
LLG officials via his ‘Limus Structure’ (Kalinoe 2009: 34).  In this case, bypassing the normal system 
and instead allocating resources through local political strongmen nearly brought the province to its 
knees and had profound negative consequences for the provincial administration and local service 
delivery.  In this environment, the role of LLG presidents has been significantly reduced, whereas the 
MP and district administrator now possess significant powers (Cammack 2008: 37). A further irony is 
that district administrators and MPs are not accountable to LLGs, and thus are easily able to 
manipulate them.   
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 A former government minister who held the ministerial portfolio of minister of intergovernmental relations. 
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Marginalisation of LLGs 
It seems clear that the main reason for Dreikikir LLG’s weak capacity to address local, provincial and 
national development agendas is that it is prevented from doing so by the JDP & BPC and the district 
administration.  Those responsible for developing and co-ordinating Dreikikir LLG’s plan formulation 
and skills development - namely the JDP & BPC and the district administration – are not doing their 
jobs.  A second reason is that fiscal control by those in authority has made the LLG financially reliant 
upon them.  As a result the LLG cannot undertake the activities it wishes, where and how it wishes to 
do so.  A third reason is the lack of horizontal accountability to Dreikikir LLG by public service 
officials. Local officials are thus unreliable, but Dreikikir LLG lacks the independent decision-making 
capacity to address issues on its own.  As a result Dreikikir LLG is now a spectator to what it should 
be implementing.  
As can be seen from the case study of Dreikikir LLG, and incidences from across PNG, LLGs face 
great difficulties in trying to deliver effectively to their wards and ultimately their local people.  
Priorities are unlikely to be aligned if there are no plans and no co-ordination by local officials with 
the LLG and local ward leaders.  Failure by the district administration to develop skills and awareness 
of the roles of ward members has left members sidelined.  In the final analysis, blame must fall onto 
the district administrator, as the district's chief executive officer, and the district’s JDP & BPC and 
provincial administration.  All have failed in their duties as mandated by the 1995 OLPLLG.  
The 1995 reforms sought to make local-level government more effective.  However, it failed to make 
it fiscally independent; instead it made it dependent upon upper levels of government.  Whilst the 
district does practise vertical accountability, there is no horizontal accountability towards LLGs.  
Hence when constrained by limited resources, unreliable funding, unqualified personnel and political 
manipulation (which is reinforced by the new structure) LLGs become helpless.  This makes it very 
difficult for them to implement national development agendas via a top-down and bottom-up 
approach whilst at the same time addressing their local issues.  The bottom line is that LLGs in PNG 
are simply rubber stamps, given the huge marginalisation they face. 
Conclusion  
LLGs in PNG seem to be in quite a predicament, if the case of Dreikikir LLG is typical.  Whilst the 
1995 reforms envisaged change and success, this has not been forthcoming.  The system has 
facilitated widespread abuse by the MP, the district administration and the JDP & BPC, preventing 
LLGs from effectively implementing national and local development agendas.  There is therefore a 
great need to free LLGs from this straitjacket and make them independent, fiscally self-reliant, amply 
resourced and staffed with qualified personnel on the ground.  If national and local development 
agendas are to be addressed effectively, the existing scenario must change – otherwise the current 
constraints will continue to impede effective development at the LLG level. 
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The 1995 OLPLLG should be revisited and provisions made to remedy these difficulties.  
Strengthening LLGs’ legal position will certainly make them more effective, but this strengthening 
needs to include funding structures, power relations with the JDP & BPC and the district 
administration, and measures to ensure these personnel are accountable to LLGs.  It is only through 
such an approach that local and national plans can be developed and targeted more effectively. 
However it must also be noted that LLGs too must be made accountable.  Vertical accountability is 
not sufficient; there must also be horizontal accountability to local people, enabling them to see for 
themselves that their LLG has become more effective.  Finally, if development strategies are to be 
implemented effectively, then LLGs must cease to be ‘rubber stamps’ and instead become actual 
implementers of national and local development agendas.  
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